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FOREWORD
Pressure for the future spread of nuclear power for
both peaceful and military purposes has been recently
noticeable expecially in the Middle East. Virtually all
countries in the region have expressed an interest in
utilizing at least some aspect of atomic power, and
in this monograph Dr. Norman Cigar examines the
status of such thinking in post-Saddam Iraq. Public
discussions in Iraq are surprisingly free, and one can
find a willingness to express a range of views, even
on a sensitive topic such as nuclear power, that would
have been unthinkable a few years ago.
Dr. Cigar has sampled opinions from all key sectors
in Iraq—government officials, politicians, religious
figures, scientists, academics, and news media
pundits—largely the informed public, or those who
are likely to have influence on future decisions in this
arena. Dr. Cigar highlights the consensus for the
rebuilding of a nuclear establishment at least for
peaceful purposes, but also the divergent views in
the country on the utility of nuclear weapons, and
the fragmented and evolving political environment in
which such decisions will be made. He also evaluates
the concrete steps being taken by the new Iraqi
government to play a role in the peaceful nuclear
sector and the very real obstacles which it will have
to overcome. Dr. Cigar highlights the difficulty of
isolating Iraq from regional trends and the need to
manage and control the process through international
and bilateral safeguards, requiring some U.S. policy
decisions.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer
this study as a contribution to identifying and analyzing this significant emerging policy issue, hoping it
will be of relevance and interest to military and civilian
iii

analysts, planners, scientists, and national and allied
policymakers. It is also anticipated that the results of
this analysis will provide a useful data baseline to help
policymakers in their efforts to control proliferation
and minimize the risk of nuclear accidents in order to
ensure a safe Middle East.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This monograph provides an overview and analysis
of thinking in Iraq on the issue of nuclear power. Nuclear power has long held a special fascination for Iraq,
and despite past controversies, this issue continues to
draw the attention of numerous influential Iraqis in
the post-Saddam era. Informed public opinion in Iraq
today is clearly a more important factor for understanding the background of decisionmaking than it was
during the Saddam era, so that this monograph addresses the views of all the sectors of Iraqi society likely
to have an input into decisionmaking in this arena.
There is an emerging Iraqi consensus on the desirability of a peaceful nuclear program, with arguments
supported by the expected benefits for electric power
generation, agriculture, and medicine, as well as an
eventual transition from oil. National pride is also a
motivating factor, as nuclear power is viewed as an
indicator of modernity and as proof of being able to
keep up with regional neighbors. As for a military
application of nuclear power, those expressing a
positive view—all outside the current government—
see nuclear weapons as an effective political and
military instrument and as necessary to balance
Israel’s nuclear arsenal, although their support is
voiced on behalf of “the Arabs” in general rather
than using the more sensitive term, Iraq. The belief
in the effectiveness of a balance of terror in ensuring
security and stability is widespread. Perceptions about
a prospective Iranian nuclear weapon, however, most
often break down along confessional lines, with most
Shi’a welcoming the prospect as a boost to the Shi’a
community’s security, while Sunnis continue earlier
views of a nuclear-armed Iran as a threat. There is little
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concern over potential environmental implications or
potential accidents, or attention to ethical issues.
One should expect in Iraq the same movement
toward nuclear power as in the rest of the Middle
East, at least in the civilian sector. However,
daunting obstacles remain to rebuilding the country’s
eviscerated nuclear infrastructure, which resulted
from the dismantling of many facilities, the removal
of fissionable material, and the emigration or death
of former nuclear scientists. However, Baghdad has
taken steps to reintegrate the country into the nuclear
research structure of the Arab world and to end existing restrictive international controls. For example,
it has requested that France build a new reactor, and
has made an effort to regenerate its domestic scientific
community. There is no indication of any intention to
reestablish a military program; any decision to do so in
the future would be impossible to predict, given Iraq’s
evolving domestic political dynamics.
It will be difficult for the United States or the
international community to ignore or reject outright
Iraq’s expectations for a nuclear program, given the
deeply-felt entitlement throughout Iraq’s informed
public and in light of the almost universal regional
trends. But the United States can help to manage
the process of an orderly, safe, and peaceful nuclear
reintegration of Iraq in the civilian sector. At the
same time, the United States and the international
community should ensure that any return to a nuclear
program be accompanied by Iraq’s acceptance of strict
international monitoring and controls to prevent any
diversion to the military field or terrorist use. U.S.
policymakers and military leaders should also focus
on ensuring that any peaceful nuclear program in Iraq
be as secure from accidents as possible through training and assistance.
viii

Once stability increases in Iraq, U.S. military and
civilian government agencies should launch an effort
to educate the Iraqi military, government officials, and
the general population on the benefits and risks of
nuclear power. Intelligence analysts should continue
to monitor Iraqi public opinion on the nuclear issue,
as well as any Iraqi actions which could lead to
undesired results, including support from other
countries. More broadly, U.S. and international leaders
can work to modify the overall Middle East regional
threat environment so as to alleviate the domestic
pressures for nuclear proliferation both in the civilian
and in the military sphere, especially by encouraging
genuine progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Finally,
U.S. policymakers can support and reassure the
Iraqi government and public, with regard to an
incipient Iranian nuclear threat, although the inclusion of an "umbrella" for Israel or requests for a
permanent U.S. military presence in the region would
likely derail such an initiative. Awareness of and
sensitivity to Iraqi thinking on the nuclear issue, in
general, will facilitate the crafting of more effective U.S.
policies which can in turn contribute to the security of
the Middle East region and beyond.
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THINKING ABOUT NUCLEAR POWER
IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ
INTRODUCTION
The Terms of Reference.
Nuclear power has long held a special fascination
for Iraq, as it has for many other countries, not only as
a source of energy and as an engine of technological
progress, but also as a potent weapon in a country’s
arsenal and as a tangible achievement which could
serve to legitimize a regime in the eyes of national,
regional, and world opinion.1 Although Saddam
Hussein’s well-documented effort to acquire nuclear
weapons ultimately came to naught, it nevertheless
has weighed heavily on the country’s recent history.
The persistent issue of nuclear power has
continued to draw the attention of Iraqis in the postSaddam era. Discussions in the news media, despite
their understandably subdued tone given the sensitive
political environment of the past few years, reveal a
continuing interest in a nuclear future for the country.
In fact, it appears that discussions about nuclear
power have been increasing in frequency as a new
status quo took form and as the U. S. presence was
expected to recede. Public opinion in Iraq indicates an
enduring interest in reestablishing a nuclear capability
at least for peaceful purposes, although Iraqis also
still seek to grapple intellectually with the concepts
of the utility and consequences of nuclear power in
geostrategic and military terms.
Nuclear issues were pivotal in U.S. policymakers’
focus and argumentation—if perhaps grossly misused
and mistaken—in the period preceding the launching
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of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2003.2 However,
such concerns have now largely disappeared from
the policy horizon. The absence of any weaponsrelated nuclear facilities, a fact emerging after the
invasion, and the pressing immediate concerns
stemming from efforts to rebuild the Iraqi nation have
overshadowed the continuing significance of such
issues. Nevertheless, any developments in the nuclear
arena will unavoidably require decisions by the United
States and the international community on how to
manage the situation so that Iraq’s interests can be
addressed while ensuring a secure local and regional
environment.
How Iraq will decide to proceed in the nuclear
sphere in the future is still unclear. This monograph
analyzes the public discussions by Iraqis in the news
media about nuclear power in the post-Saddam era
in order to gauge prevailing views about the utility
and feasibility of all aspects of nuclear power. The
thesis here is that there is a mounting consensus and
pressure for establishing a nuclear capability, at least
in the nonmilitary sector, a prospect that is perhaps not
surprising in light of a similar trajectory throughout
the Middle East. As for support for a military nuclear
capability, the situation is more ambiguous—not
surprising perhaps, given the sensitivity of that issue
and the delicate current political balance in Iraq—but
present indications are that while many Iraqis do view
even a military application as positive, unpredictable
domestic political considerations will be crucial in
whether Iraq pursues such a path in the future.
Informed public opinion in Iraq today is clearly
a more important factor for understanding the
background of decisionmaking than it was during the
Saddam era, when it was essentially mute. This factor

2

is even more salient given the fragmented nature of
the country’s present-day political establishment and
the lack, at least for now, of a hegemonic center. This
public dialogue among Iraqis extends to the issue of
nuclear power, although discussions in this area may
still not be completely unfettered, given the continuing
sensitivity of the topic, and especially given the
possibility of an adverse American reaction. One can
presume that present discourse is thus affected by at
least some self-censorship, as well as by the normal
prudence in the case of public figures, who must be
careful to avoid treading in controversial areas because
of their official status. Nevertheless, there are enough
Iraqis sufficiently open with their views that one can
delineate the general lines of thinking about options
for the future of nuclear power in the country.
Research Sources and Methods.
The research for this monograph focuses on the
views of Iraqi participants in the discussion about
nuclear power both in Iraq and in the diaspora. The
latter’s opinions are easily available to the public back
home in Iraq via the internet. Thus there is now largely
a single discussion arena, at least for the informed
public. In fact, those Iraqis based abroad may feel less
constrained about expressing their views than those
in Iraq, given the still substantial, albeit diminishing,
U.S. presence and scrutiny.
The commentators considered here range across
the spectrum of politics and society, including nuclear
scientists, government officials, political and religious
figures, and intellectuals. It is these actors who are
involved in the discussions on nuclear power and who
bring expertise or influence to the table. Any decisions
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in this area are not likely to be the result of popular
involvement, although opinion makers do seek to
generate public support for their ideas. The views of
Iraqi nuclear scientists are especially important, given
their status as subject matter experts and celebrities.
Their role in shaping the perceptions of rising generations of Iraqi scientists and political leaders may be
significant. Religious figures who take a public stand
also provide a degree of moral approval, a factor which
is considerably more significant now then it was during
the Saddam era. Notably missing from the discussions
are any active duty military voices, although that
may be understandable, given the immediate security
concerns which preoccupy the Iraqi military and the
continuing sensitivity of its status in today’s evolving
political environment.
One cannot always determine these days whose
views a commentator may be reflecting publicly,
whether his own or those of more influential backers—
domestic or foreign—who for politic reasons have
thus far chosen to remain silent. The significance of the
opinions of various individuals, of course, will be of
unequal weight in these discussions—depending on
their level of expertise, political ties, present job, or
access to particular news media. Surveying all such
views is nevertheless useful, as it provides a sense of
the parameters of Iraqi thinking and insights into how
the issues are framed with regard to the desirability and
utility of nuclear power in the country’s future. When
there are discordant views, these are always noted in
the study. Thus, in the absence of such indications, the
assumption is that there is a consensus.
Scott Sagan has provided a useful approach to
understanding why states acquire nuclear weapons,
and one can extend at least part of that framework to
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the issue of nuclear power in general, whether civilian
or military. He identifies three main national motivations, namely, the need to respond to foreign threats,
the product of domestic political and bureaucratic
dynamics, and the desire to project an identity of
modernity and technological prowess. Elements of all
three can be glimpsed in the case of Iraq.3
LOBBYING FOR ATOMIC POWER
The Economic Argument.
Discreet lobbying by Iraqis in favor of reviving
the country’s nuclear program—at least for peaceful
purposes—began soon after the downfall of Saddam.
As early as the fall of 2003, Iraqi nuclear scientists
were urging a resumption of a peaceful nuclear program, touting the tangible benefits that would accrue
to the country.
Take for example, Hamid Al-Bahili—originally
the director of the Osirak/Tammuz reactor complex,
a professor of nuclear engineering, and at present
Adviser in the Office of the Prime Minister and an
Iraqi government representative on nuclear issues
abroad. His upcoming book, serialized in the newspaper of one of the main Shi’a parties, charts his
vision for a nuclear future in the post-Saddam era.
Al-Bahili stresses the importance of nuclear power
for Iraq and highlights its peaceful roles, such as the
generation of electricity and uses in medicine, industry, and agriculture.4 Iraqi scientists abroad also
expressed support for nuclear power, and in fact
Asad Al-Khafaji, then working in Canada, argued
that the absence of the peaceful use of nuclear
power would be considered “backwardness in the
cultural, economic, and technological arenas.”5
5

Acknowledging the concern of some about the potential destructiveness of nuclear weapons, at the same
time he dismissed arguments that oil and natural gas
would be available forever, and severely criticized
those who saw “any activity with nuclear energy as
simply futile and playing with fire.”6 The editor of an
Iraqi scientific journal likewise concluded that “simply
put, we cannot do without nuclear power . . . as a
fundamental substitute for the generation of electric
power. When oil and gas supplies run out, nuclear
power will be the inexhaustible stand-by for the generation of future energy.”7
Such testimonials on behalf of the benefits of nuclear
power have continued in subsequent years, including
those by government officials. Al-Bahili has since
lauded Iraq’s “very, very great achievements” in the
nuclear arena during the Saddam era, and proposed a
comprehensive plan to rebuild Iraq’s scientific system.8
Then there is Dhiya’ Butrus Yusuf, Chief of the
Plant Breeding Department of Iraq’s Ministry of
Science and Technology, who has laid out in detail the
potential uses of nuclear technology in agriculture—
as an alternative to chemical pesticides, a counter to
livestock diseases, a multiplier of soil fertility, a tool for
genetically engineering plants, and a food preserver
via irradiation. He concludes that “nuclear technology
can be an efficient, effective, and cost-effective solution
to many of the problems which agriculture faces
around the world,” then adding that “Iraq was one
of the countries which initiated its nuclear program
for peaceful uses beginning in the 1960s of the last
century, and whose scientists are trying to maintain
the momentum of that work to this day.”9 An Iraqi
energy expert, pointing to the current problems in
generating power in Iraq, maintains that the country
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should begin shifting from its diminishing oil reserves
to renewable sources of energy, stressing that it had
uranium deposits that would last one million years,
that each square foot of uranium was equal to seven
million barrels of oil, and that nuclear fusion could
provide energy for “billions and trillions of years.”10
Al-Khafaji, too, has continued his efforts on behalf of
nuclear power, suggesting that a concerted effort be
made to convince Iraqi decisionmakers of the benefits
of rebuilding that capability.11
Not surprisingly, Iraq’s Minister of Science and
Technology, Ra’id Fahmi, has been a strong supporter
of nuclear power, equating its establishment to a basic
prerequisite for Iraq’s social and economic rebirth,
while giving assurances that Iraq would comply fully
with all international guidelines.12 One of the most
eloquent spokesmen in favor of resuming a nuclear
program has been Hussein Al-Shahristani, currently
Iraq’s Minister of Oil, and himself one of the country’s
most experienced nuclear scientists. He has argued, for
example, that “it is vital for Iraq to have a developed
nuclear research program for the peaceful use of
nuclear power in the fields of medicine, agriculture,
and industry,” but admitted that Iraq’s abundant
reserves of oil and gas were already sufficient for
the production of energy.13 Al-Shahristani was also
careful to stress that civilian reactors could not be
used to produce material for nuclear weapons and
that there was little likelihood of a diversion of nuclear
materials.14
Perhaps sensing that the case for nuclear materials
pertaining to medicine might be the least controversial
application, discussants have surfaced it most frequently. One Iraqi scientist, for example, noted that
when the country’s nuclear program had been can-
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celed, “the first victim [was] our hospitals.”15 Significantly, in 2008 the Baghdad municipal authorities
announced their intention to establish a 50-bed nuclear
medicine hospital.16
National Pride.
Many Iraqis view nuclear power for their country
as a basic national right or, as Minister Fahmi called it,
Iraq’s “sovereign right.”17 Some politicians have been
more reserved, with the key factor for them being not
the desirability of nuclear power but the timing. As
one member of the Iraqi National Assembly stated on
United Arab Emirates (UAE) television, “The time is
not appropriate at present to build a nuclear reactor,
[we prefer] new oil refineries for the short term instead,
since even though the nuclear option would address a
real problem, Iraq for now did not have the necessary
possibilities.”18 However, another participant on the
same television program, while admitting that the
internal situation and state of the infrastructure were
inadequate at present, countered that Iraq as a state
had the right to acquire a nuclear capability, that now
was simply “a short pause (tawaqqufat shwayya) with
regard to nuclear power,” and that nuclear power was
a form of “fantastic energy.” He proposed at least small
research reactors for the present.19
Nuclear power is seen in Iraq by virtually everyone
in the informed public—equally true in much of the
region—as quintessentially emblematic of scientific
and intellectual progress, a sort of litmus test for
a country’s standing in relation to its peers, and
something to which a government can point as a
concrete achievement to boost its national pride and
legitimacy. Supporters of nuclear power in Iraq have
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argued that this has been the “most important field of
scientific-technological research bar none in Iraq.”20
An Iraqi government scientist even concluded that
“no country can progress and develop culturally and
scientifically without [nuclear technology].”21 In the
same vein, Dhiya’ Butrus Yusuf accepted as a given
that “one of the benchmarks of progress for states and
peoples is the possession of nuclear technology.”22 For
one nuclear scientist, an Iraqi nuclear capability was
even essential as a guarantee against Iraq returning
to “the wasteland of backwardness and poverty.”23
Not surprisingly, Iraq’s Ministry of Science and
Technology now has an atom symbol as the most
prominent element of its logo, while the homepage of
the Ministry’s official website is dominated by a large
animated atomic emblem.24
Iraqis naturally compare their country to their
neighbors in the region and must now find it
distressing to see themselves falling behind countries
they had often looked down upon in the past as
having a lower level of progress. Baghdad certainly
feels itself regressing as other countries in the region
take steps to develop nuclear power capabilities—
not to speak of nuclear weaponization in Iran and
Syria.25 For example, one Iraqi university professor
was proud that Iraq had been “at the forefront of the
Arab and Middle East countries in terms of having the
solid advanced scientific brains and capabilities in all
disciplines and fields,” but now fretted that the recent
brain drain would remove Iraq from “the caravan of
scientific progress and to its significant regression in
comparison with the past period when we were far
in the lead.”26 A former senior Iraqi military officer
likewise urged public support for convincing the Iraqi
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government to build nuclear power plants, stressing
that this was already being done in Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and the UAE.27 The Iraqi news media routinely
highlight the nuclear plans of neighboring countries
with an implicit sense of envy and resentment. As
noted above, Iraqis must find it particularly galling for
countries that in the past they considered backward
and insignificant—such as Kuwait—to be passing them
by in nuclearization. In fact, for Dhiya’ Butrus Yusuf,
one reason for reenergizing the nuclear program is
to raise Iraq’s status above “the ranks of the other
countries.”28
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN IRAQ’S FUTURE?
Understandably, the greatest concern for the
United States and the international community
should be any Iraqi thinking about reviving a nuclear
weapons program, however unlikely and unrealistic
that might be in the near term. Here, as one might
expect, discussions are often more discreet or indirect
than is the case when dealing with nuclear power for
peaceful purposes. The issue, if talked about openly
at all, is often done by Iraqis living outside of Iraq.
Usually, arguments by Iraqis in favor of nuclear
weapons are softened by speaking about and on
behalf of “the Arabs” rather than specifically about
Iraq, or by focusing on the utility of nuclear weapons
possessed or being developed by Iraq’s neighbors or
by countries further afield. This indirect approach is
expected to be less controversial in the eyes of outside
observers. Iraqi commentators of all affiliations—apart
from unreconstructed Ba’athists—are sensitive about
potential accusations of promoting policies linked to
the Saddam regime, especially with the predominant
American presence in Iraq since 2003. Addressing the
10

issue in regional terms may also be a way to garner
broader support among neighbors.
Not surprisingly, the remaining Iraqi Ba’athi
opposition has been the most outspoken in supporting
nuclear weapons for Iraq, praising Saddam for his
nuclearization efforts while he was in power, and
acknowledging for the first time that that effort had
begun as early as the Osirak/Tammuz reactor project,
the principal motivation having been to confront
Israel.29
However, there is also a broad feeling among
many other Iraqis engaged in these discussions that
nuclear weapons in general provide a country with
a unique military capability and that such weapons
have a beneficial impact on any country’s security and
geopolitical influence. For example, one Iraqi nuclear
scientist concluded that “nuclear weapons have played
an enormous and pivotal role in determining the shape
of the balance of international relations whereby the
strong exploit the weak.”30 Often, Iraqis nowadays
address the issue by emphasizing the importance of
nuclear weapons for other countries’ strategy and, in
particular, for what many perceive as Israel’s or Iran’s
ambitions for regional hegemony.
Assessing Nuclear Threats to Iraq.
The perspective that Iraqi discussants have on a
nuclear threat to their country not only reveals their
assessment of the potential utility of nuclear weapons,
but may also influence their readiness to support a
similar Iraqi path one day. In the past, insofar as an
actual or potential nuclear threat was concerned,
Baghdad considered Israel, the United States, and
eventually Iran to be most potentially threatening. In
some ways, the Iraqis’ view of threats has remained
11

constant, but in other ways it has evolved since the
collapse of the Saddam regime.
The Israeli Threat. As far as Israel is concerned, there
remains in Iraq (and elsewhere in the Arab world) a
deep-seated concern about the perceived threat from
that country—including the nuclear aspect—and such
concern is advanced frequently as motivation and
justification for further proliferation in the region.
For example, an op-ed piece in a Shi’a publication in
Iraq held that “Israel threatens the Arab countries . . .
with its nuclear monopoly and its aggressive policies
against the Arab states and also threatens international
stability.”31 According to this source, Israel was
said to have achieved “geo-political victories” in the
form of unequal political agreements with the Arabs
specifically because of “the imbalance of power in
the region in which Israel is the hegemonic actor who
raises the nuclear, military, and economic stick over
the heads of everyone else.”32
An Iraqi nuclear scientist was likewise critical
of Israel’s nuclear monopoly, asserting that “when
only one side has nuclear weapons, that leads to an
unjust hegemony in the geo-political situation in the
region.”33 Yet another commentator stressed that it was
the Israeli nuclear threat which prompted neighboring
countries to also embark on nuclear proliferation.34 For
his part, the Shi’a Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Al-Hasani
Al-Baghdadi of Najaf saw as unfair that “Israel has the
right to possess 200 nuclear warheads, while no other
state in the region has the right to have even a single
nuclear bomb,” attributing such an imbalance to the
U.S. desire to maintain Israel as the strongest power in
the region.35
The Ambivalence Toward an Iranian Nuclear Threat.
On the other hand, perhaps no single aspect of Iraqi
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thinking on nuclear weapons has evolved as much as
perceptions of a nuclear threat from Iran. In the past,
the Iraqi argument in favor of nuclear weapons was
often cast in terms of the need to counter an incipient
Iranian nuclear capability, as well as the existing Israeli
one. However, in today’s context, Iraqi concerns about
a future Iranian bomb have become considerably more
nuanced, with views frequently—but not exclusively—
dividing along sectarian/communal lines.
The Iraqi Shi’a Viewpoint. Many in Iraq’s Shi’a
community, while not wishing to subordinate their
country to Iran, nevertheless may consider the latter
as a guarantor against what they see as threats
from neighboring Sunni countries, Israel, or the
United States, and view Iran’s acquisition of nuclear
weapons with relative equanimity. As one Iraqi Shi’a
commentator put it, “Nowadays, Islamic Iran is the
strong rear area [al-dhahr al-qawi] for Iraq.”36 In a similar
argument, Iraq’s activist Shi’a Grand Ayatollah AlBaghdadi noted that “we look at the Islamic Republic
[of Iran] as a regional power, and as the Islamic
strategic depth for the Arab and Islamic peoples.”37 At
the same time, Iraqi Shi’a observers frequently parrot
Iran’s argument that its nuclear program is intended
solely for peaceful purposes.38 An Iraqi Shi’a academic
typically downplayed any Iranian nuclear threat to
Iraq, arguing during a lecture in the United States that
“Iran is a sovereign state and has the right to express
its point of view on what concerns it; it is their decision
to make and it is none of our business.”39 Similarly, a
Shi’a Parliamentarian, Falih Al-Fayyadh, claimed that
Iraq “is not frightened by Iran’s possession of nuclear
weapons . . . because that will not affect Iraq in the
least,” since relations between the two countries “do
not permit either to threaten the other.” Instead, he
added, it is Israel’s nuclear arsenal about which Iraq
13

ought to be concerned, since Israel has “aggressive
plans” in the region.40
Grand Ayatollah Al-Baghdadi, predictably, disapproved the “American-Israeli plans for opposing “the
peaceful nuclear program of the Islamic Republic [of
Iran].”41 Another writer on an Iraqi Shi’a website,
purporting to express “the point of view of many
sons of Iraq,” likewise reacted harshly to those Arab
commentators who urged the United States to strike
Iran before it acquired nuclear weapons. He dismissed
the views of those in the region who were fearful that
“Iran and the Safavid Shi’a would acquire nuclear
weapons” as stemming from hatred of Iran and of
the Shi’a in general and from jealousy of the latter’s
success.42 Indeed, he suggested that “the important
question now thrown out on the table is . . . what if
Iran or any other Shi’a . . . could liberate Palestine and
Jerusalem?” He surmised that even then the Sunnis
would be implacable enemies of the Shi’a and hostile
to Iran.43 Instead of being concerned about Iran, a proMuqtada al-Sadr writer most feared that the United
States would use the excuse of an Iranian threat to
Israel to deploy a missile shield in Iraq in order to
defend Israel.44
Some Iraqi Shi’a even went so far as to see Iranian
nuclear weapons as a positive development, with
Mundhir al-Kawthar claiming it would be “for the
good of humanity.” In this observer’s view, the Iranian
nuclear program—and clearly what is alluded to by
this term are nuclear weapons—would provide a
balance to “Israel’s arrogance” and pressure the United
States to solve the Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestinian
issues. According to the same source, Iran’s nuclear
program “does not represent any danger whatsoever.”
On the contrary, he assured readers that a nuclear
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capability “would ensure peace in the broader Middle
East region,” and credited nuclear deterrence as the
reason for a reduced likelihood of war between India
and Pakistan. Arguing that it was unfair to accept that
Israel and North Korea could be nuclear powers but
not Iran, the author attributed Iran’s desire for nuclear
weapons as defensive, stemming from its fear of Israel
and the United States, and contending that the Western
countries were opposed because they “do not like a
state with an independent will” in an oil-rich region,
and that the Arab leaders were simply alarmed about
the threat to their own positions. 45 Another Iraqi writer
concluded that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it
would mean “the collapse of classical American
military superiority over the latter,” and predicted that
the United States would therefore try to prevent Iran
from achieving that decisive capability.46
On the other hand, one Shi’a nuclear scientist living in Algeria, Abd Al-Kadhim Al-Abboudi, diverged
from the general Shi’a consensus, weaving instead a
complex web of nuclear conspiracies that accuse the
United States, Israel, and Iran of all plotting to use
nuclear weapons against the Arabs. His leftist secular
political leanings apparently trumped his communal
ties.47
Given the prevailing public opinion in Iraq, the
Nuri Al-Maliki government categorically rejected the
use of Iraqi airspace for any Israeli strike against Iran.48
On the U.S.-financed Radio Sawa, even the country’s
Sunni Vice President, Tariq Al-Hashimi, perhaps out
of concern about an Iranian backlash and resulting
instability in the region in case of a U.S. attack, advised
against an attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, going
so far as to claim that Iran had a right to its peaceful
nuclear program.49
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The Iraqi Sunni Viewpoint. Other Iraqis, however,
have been much more critical of Iran’s potential
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Some have expressed
skepticism of the need for Iran to go nuclear even
for peaceful purposes, citing other better sources for
generating electricity, such as solar power, and have
also raised doubts about Iran’s stated intent not to use
nuclear power for military purposes.50
One secular leftist observer interpreted Iran’s
quest for nuclear weapons as revealing its “aggressive
objectives.”51 A Sunni commentator concluded that
if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, that would
“put the region under Iranian control.”52 Another
Sunni writer opined that the balance of power
between Iran and Iraq had already been broken and
that having nuclear weapons could help Iran spread
its Shi’a propaganda. He worried that no neighbor
could match Iran’s “pretensions of hegemony.”53 Still
another writer expressed indignation at what he saw as
Iran’s demeaning treatment of Iraq and equated Iran’s
current leadership with Saddam in its willingness
to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against
others as well as for blackmail. Thus he saw a need for
the West to block Tehran.54 An Iraqi intellectual living
abroad even inquired rhetorically as to who would be
more merciful with its nuclear weapons toward Iraq—
Iran or Israel. He posited that the Iranian regime was
more dangerous, since it was similar to that of Saddam
and would not be deterred by the thought of mass
casualties. What is more, he concluded, “The Islamic
religion will not serve as a deterrent to leaders such
as the present rulers of Iran in their using all banned
[weapons] in pursuit of their national interests at the
expense of all the Arabs and Muslims.”55
Lieutenant General Wafiq Al-Samarra’i, at one time
chief of military intelligence under Saddam, dismis16

sed the idea of a nuclear threat to Iraq from Israel,
claiming that the latter would use that capability only
for deterrence. Asked if he thought that Iran instead
had already become the greater threat, Al-Samarra’i
replied: “Yes, no doubt about it.”56 Others also
dismissed an Iranian nuclear threat to Israel, believing
instead that it was Iran’s Arab neighbors who would
be the first victims, given Tehran’s hostility toward
the latter.57 Another commentator—a former leader
of the Iraqi Communist Party—expressed the view
that Iran would use its nuclear capability for military
purposes, but not against Israel. Rather, it would use
it to blackmail and threaten Iraq and the Gulf states,
and urged the European Union (EU) to bring the
matter up in the United Nations Security Council.58
Indeed, one commentator claimed that once Iran had
nuclear weapons, its resulting swagger would lead “to
a renewal in the export of the Revolution again after
it had been stopped by the First Gulf War.”59 A Sunni
candidate for Speaker of Parliament, Taha Al-Lahibi,
downplayed an Iranian nuclear threat to Iraq but only
because he claimed, sarcastically, that Iran already had
a dominant presence in Iraq and did not need to use
nuclear weapons to get its way with Baghdad, and
that it should be the other neighbors instead who must
worry.60
A U.S.-financed Baghdad newspaper, on the other
hand, counseled Iran not to threaten its neighbors with
its nuclear program, but the reason given was that
such a threat would drive other regional states to seek
protection from foreign forces.61
Commentators in Iraqi Ba’athi circles, predictably,
have been especially alarmist about an Iranian bomb,
and one Ba’athi spokesman claimed that Iran would
“exploit its nuclear project as a tool for pressure to
increase its share of Iraq’s remains,” in competition
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with the United States.62 Another commentator on
the official Ba’ath website concluded that, thanks to
nuclear weapons, Iran will have taken “a great step
toward imposing its hegemony over all the countries
of the oil region.”63 Another spokesman for the Ba’ath
made a universal plea for help in preventing “the rise
of a nuclear Iran by whatever means.”64 In fact, another
Iraqi Ba’athi went so far as to claim that the United
States planned to maintain the Ba’ath Party “in reserve”
if it struck at Iran because of the latter’s nuclear program, due to the Ba’ath’s implacable enmity toward
Iran.65
Assessing Other Nuclear Threats.
In contrast, there seems to be limited public concern
in Iraq about Syria’s potential for acquiring nuclear
weapons. Perhaps this relative indifference may be
because Syria’s success is not viewed as imminent,
that Syria is not seen as a direct threat, or that less
information is available about Syria than about Iran
or Israel. After the Israeli air strike in September 2007
against what Iraqis believed were Syrian nuclear
facilities, for example, the principal concern seems
to have been that Iraq might be affected by nuclear
fallout, given the proximity of the targeted area to the
Iraqi border.66 Iraq’s Association of Muslim Scholars,
a grouping of Sunni ulama, accused the United States
of repeating the same policy against Syria as it had
against Iraq in the “nuclear weapons farce,” i.e., by
falsely claiming that Syria was developing nuclear
weapons.67 Some Iraqis remain vocally critical of Iran,
such as one newspaper editor who termed the Iranians’
pursuit of nuclear weapons “a threat not only to the
security of the region but specifically to the security
of the Arab Gulf”—and implicitly therefore also to
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Iraq. Syria’s greatest fault, in his view, was its support
for Iran’s nuclear program rather than any activity by
Syria in the same field.68
Viewing matters from a Shi’a position, on the other
hand, one Iraqi observer even posited a future nuclear
threat to Iraq from Jordan, given the latter’s hostility
to the Shi’a community in both Iraq and Iran. His
conclusion was that for Iraq to achieve a “balance of
terror” vis-à-vis Jordan, it would have to build its own
nuclear reactors, although use of the latter on behalf of
a weapons program was only implicit.69
As for any future American nuclear threat—which
had played at least a supporting role in spurring Iraq’s
pursuit of nuclear weapons during the Saddam era—
that is not seen as a pressing likelihood nowadays, and
even if there were any such concern it is unlikely it
would be revealed publicly, given the sensitivity of the
local political situation as the United States continues
its pullout.
The Kurdish Viewpoint.
Iraqi Kurds, less deeply involved in the national
and regional debate on nuclear power for Iraq, appear
more concerned about any potential negative effects
of nuclear power on their own area and may still feel
a latent concern about the potential military use of
nuclear weapons against their community in the future, a fear born of past experience with Saddam’s use
of chemical weapons against them. For example,
Masoud Al-Barzani, President of the Kurdistan region,
when asked about the Iranian nuclear program,
responded blandly: “We hope that the region will be
free of all destructive nuclear weapons, because we
suffered in the past from such banned weapons, and
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the Kurdish people paid a great price because of that
at the hands of the former regime.”70
At the same time, some Kurds do voice concern
about Iran’s impending acquisition of nuclear
weapons. Intellectual Jawdat Hushiyar, for example,
stated: “There is no doubt that an Iran with nuclear
weapons will upset the existing military balance in the
region dangerously, and particularly between Iraq and
Iran,” a situation that could prove dangerous if some
dispute were to erupt between the two countries. He
then excoriated Iraq’s religious-based Shi’a parties for
ignoring the threat.71 Other Kurds, like Parliamentarian
Abd Al-Bari Zibari, have more typically been prone to
temporize, noting that “it is way too early to consider
Iran a nuclear state.” He expressed the belief that
international pressure would very likely convince Iran
to desist and that the United States would not permit
Iran to acquire nuclear weapons in any event.72
Religiously motivated Kurds, on the other hand,
seem to take a more nuanced position, based on a
greater sensitivity to the Israeli threat. One Kurdish
writer on a religious website, for example, held that
a nuclear Iran would provide a balance against Israel,
but would also prove threatening to non-nuclear
neighbors, especially in the Gulf. He noted that nuclear
proliferation would be difficult to halt unless the
double standard favoring Israel was terminated.73
The Utility of Nuclear Weapons.
Whatever the partisan and confessional coloring of
the debate, virtually all Iraqi commentators agree that
nuclear weapons are effective in bestowing greater
power to a country. Most Iraqis involved in such
discussions seem to be in the “optimist” camp of nuc-
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lear partisans, who see proliferation as a means to
achieve balance and stability through mutual
deterrence. They take comfort in the analogy—however
analytically tenuous—of the relationship between the
superpowers during the Cold War. Asad Al-Khafaji,
for example, held that “destructive nuclear weapons
were used to kill millions of innocent civilians at a time
when one side had a monopoly. When the monopoly
was broken and that weapon spread to the reaches of
the East and West, surprise, surprise, the situation then
became secure! . . . In sum, I support the proliferation
of nuclear weapons to all the parties involved in a
conflict.”74
Even an Iraqi who counseled Iran to end its nuclear
program so as to avoid a confrontation with the
United States and Europe nevertheless acknowledged
that “the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any state
results in a relative psychological reassurance (istiqrar
nafsi) and confidence for that state in relation to foreign
military threats and attacks against it by others.”75
At the same time, others have acknowledged
the potential for an upsurge of instability, as a state
acquiring such weapons is also said to “experience
an increase in its might and an expansion of its power
and influence.”76 One observer concluded that “if Iran
acquires a nuclear bomb, the White House will no
longer be able to block any Iranian attempt to expand
eastward or westward, as it was able to do with the
Iraqi Ba’athi regime when it attempted to swallow
up Kuwait.”77 And still another Iraqi writer, although
dismissing widespread charges that Iran had aggressive intentions against its neighbors, and praising it
instead for its challenge to Israeli expansionism,
concluded that if Iran did acquire nuclear weapons
“that will mean opening the terrible gates of hell for
the Americans.”78
21

As noted earlier, when Iraqis verbalize their
support for a nuclear sector within the military realm,
they often broach the topic using the more ambiguous
term of “the Arabs,” seeking to avoid any politicallycharged allusions to Iraq itself. For example, Iraqi
nuclear scientist Asad Al-Khafaji argued that it was
the balance of nuclear terror which had kept the peace
between the superpowers during the Cold War, as
well as between India and Pakistan. He then asked
rhetorically: “Must the Arabs continue to cater to the
feelings of their Western allies and not disturb the
situation of a lack of strategic nuclear balance of power
in the region?”79 Al-Khafaji, perhaps sensing that talk
of a renewed unilateral nuclear program in Iraq might
be premature, urged the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) countries instead to use their money to finance
a joint nuclear development effort with other unnamed
Arab countries, arguing that this would allow the GCC
states to dispense with large conventional forces for
defense.80 Elsewhere, he has used the more vaguely
amorphous term “the countries of the Gulf.” This term
could be interpreted to include Iraq as the actor who
could establish a nuclear “balance of terror with the
Jewish state or with the Shi’a state [i.e., Iran],” a scenario
he viewed as “a legal international right which no one
can dispute.”81
Another nuclear scientist, Numan Al-Naimi,
openly opined that Iraq, too, should have that right,
insisting that “possession of a nuclear [capability] is a
legitimate right in order to have technology, science,
and the power to defend onself. Depriving Iraq of this
technology only achieves the West’s strategic goal,”
and he went on to rue the fact that the post-Saddam
government did not protect the country’s scientists
and that many had even been imprisoned.82 To be sure,
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even those supporting nuclear weapons for Iraq have
been careful to emphasize that such a capability would
be used only for deterrence by creating a “balance
of nuclear terror” with Israel and Iran, thereby
contributing to regional stability and security. As AlKhafaji put it, “The principle of ‘the balance of nuclear
terror’ is the only practical solution to putting an end
to the arrogance of just one party which has nuclear
weapons in a conflict.”83
Bogus claims in the news media by Iraqis to the
effect that Western forces have already used nuclear
weapons against Iraq may also make the environment
more congenial to an Iraqi nuclear option in the
future. For example, the former Commander of the
Republican Guards, Lieutenant-General Sayf Al-Din
Al-Rawi, maintained that U.S. forces had used neutron
weapons in the attack on Baghdad Airport, while an
unnamed Iraqi physicist accused the British of using
air-launched nuclear-tipped missiles against Southern
Iraq.84 There are claims by other Iraqis that the
international atmosphere is not conducive to nuclear
disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons
being unrealistic. They point to the U.S. retention and
modernization of its own nuclear arsenal, with one
Iraqi commentator labeling nonproliferation talk as
“no more than sophistry” and asserting that peaceful
coexistence is “just a myth.”85
Making a Case for Nuclear Weapons. An Iraqi Shi’a
pundit, Hamid Al-Shakir, has made perhaps the most
straightforward and extended argument in the Iraqi
news media in favor of acquiring nuclear weapons.86
He develops his basic premise by asking whether,
given that some states have nuclear weapons, others
should seek a symmetrical capability or whether
they should accept the “status quo so as to ensure the
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superiority of some states over others in order to create
a peace of the strong over the weak.” Al-Shakir views
international relations from a realpolitik perspective,
emphasizing the primacy of power, and noting that
“international law is nothing but the other face of
power.” For him, it is technological, military, and
strategic power which give states a “seat at the table”
where the right and the wrong of law are determined.
Only power can lead to authentic peace rather than
peace imposed by the enemy—neither good intentions
nor an imbalance of power can produce peace.
Moreover, he specifically equates the possession of
nuclear weapons with having a seat at the table.
Al-Shakir accuses the West of promoting peace
in the Middle East while opposing the buildup of
military power by local states, again asking whether
the “Islamic Arab states” can accept peace with Israel
and the world while they are “completely empty
and bereft of all power.” In particular, he focuses on
whether peace can be crafted between a weak state
and a great nuclear state, noting that no one wants to
negotiate from a position of weakness, and that if one
side lacks nuclear weapons it is automatically weak.
He continues to stress the need for peace through
strength. He even warns that one could wake up one
day and find an Arab or Islamic country “wiped off
the human map by devastating nuclear bombs. . . at
the hands of Israel or the United States of America.” In
his view, Israel would be willing to undertake such an
attack so long as it knew that there was no equivalent
retaliatory capability.
He concludes in no uncertain terms that “nuclear
war cannot be deterred except by possessing one’s
own nuclear weapons!” His solution to this precarious
situation is for the Arab or Islamic states to also acquire
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nuclear weapons, whereupon these states’ “standing
among the nations and peoples [would] change
genuinely.” In his view, having nuclear weapons will
bring about real peace, security, and stability. However, displaying obvious confessional partiality, AlShakir concludes that “this realistic strategic perspective is what induces us to demand the development
of an Islamic Shi’a nuclear arsenal which will revive
the spirit of genuine balance in the Middle East region,
and thus make possible the establishment of a different
balance between the Arabs and Muslims, on the one
hand, and Israel and the West, on the other.”
He concludes his analysis with a warning to the
effect that “if our Arab and Islamic states do not
hasten to acquire standing nuclear deterrent forces,
they unavoidably will confront real extermination
in the form of a total war which will force them to
surrender so that the master-slave relationship can be
consolidated.” While it is not clear whether the author
favors nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran, of a Shi’adominated Iraq, or both, what is unambiguous is his
conclusion that nuclear weapons are required in order
to achieve a balance with Israel and the United States.
In key aspects, this perspective is a carryover of earlier
thinking in Iraq on the utility of nuclear weapons,
and one that today is widely shared in the region as a
whole.
Marginal Dissonant Views.
The only apparent dissonant element in this overview of Iraqi thinking would seem to be the prevailing
opinion in one online forum session run by the BBC
Arabic service. Asked whether the Arabs should have
the right to acquire nuclear weapons, the majority of 47
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replies by Iraqi respondents were negative. However,
such surveys should be approached with caution.
Quite apart from the impossibility of determining
the identity of participants in an anonymous online
forum (Kurds, Christians, émigrés, those declaring
false data, etc.), the BBC site was likely to attract
younger, Western-oriented, contributors, with little
political clout. What is more, the often critical assessments expressed in this forum about the “Arabs”
may reflect Iraqi views of their neighbors’ capabilities
and trustworthiness more than views about their own
country.87 Ultimately, the impact of a small number of
anonymous bloggers on the national debate is likely to
be insignificant.
Ethical Perspectives.
One does not find discussions in Iraqi circles about
the moral/ethical implications of nuclear weapons,
even by religious figures, such as emerged in the
West especially in the early years of the nuclear era.
On the contrary, those Iraqi Shi’a ulama who have
broached the subject have used a religious argument
to support the acquisition of nuclear weapons. For
example, Grand Ayatollah Al-Baghdadi told Syrian
TV that “this Islamic Arab Umma [Arab world] must
acquire nuclear weapons.” Otherwise, he concluded,
the United States would continue to oppress and
attack the Arabs, making them the latest victims of
American colonialism.88 While Iraqi Sunni clerics have
not openly made religious arguments in support of
nuclear weapons, those Iraqi Sunnis seeking moral
support for the acquisition of nuclear weapons can
rely on the existing widespread explicit approval
among mainstream Sunni religious clerics throughout
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the region on the legitimacy of WMD, the acquisition
of which is often declared to be a duty for the Umma.
Environmental Considerations.
Unlike in the past, today there is scope in Iraq for
expressing publicly concerns about the safety and
environmental impact of nuclear power. Whatever
unease Iraqi experts have expressed on this subject,
however, has been largely oriented on the effects
stemming from the past. Although commentators
have painted a grim picture of the current radiological
contamination in Iraq, they most often blame the
situation on U.S. actions, particularly on U.S. neglect in
the wake of the collapse of security after the invasion
in 2003, when nuclear waste materials were looted
or otherwise disposed of improperly. For example,
scientists such as Anis Al-Rawi, Dean of the College of
Science at Baghdad University, and Hamid Al-Bahili
have described in graphic terms how—after U.S. forces
left the Osirak/Tammuz nuclear complex unguarded—the locals took barrels containing nuclear waste
materials, emptied the contents into the river, and then
used the barrels for their own storage purposes or to
deliver milk from dairies. They speak of the likelihood
of severe long-term health consequences for the average Iraqi from the contamination that resulted—
including sterility, birth defects, and cancer—suggesting that the United States should be responsible
for providing medical care for anyone thus afflicted.89
The country’s embryonic environmental movement
has also addressed the contamination of Iraq’s soil
and water stemming from the U.S. use of depleted
uranium munitions.90 In fact, one report concluded
that the existing contamination was an “environmental
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and health disaster,” listing all the horrendous
resulting medical problems.91 One Iraqi scientist also
worried that the United States might pressure Iraq
into allowing it to accept nuclear waste, and warned
the Iraqi government not to do so.92 This same Iraqi
scientist, in fact, proposed a postponement of any new
nuclear initiatives until the current nuclear sites were
cleaned up, noting that “the present time is not at all
appropriate for such a [new nuclear] initiative until the
appropriate authorities address this [contamination]
issue and decontaminate all the land completely.”93
However, in Iraq the focus on safety or environmental issues does not seem to be linked to the future
or to be intertwined with considerations about the
basic desirability of nuclear power. Although such allegations released in the public domain may give
second thoughts to some about the safety of nuclear
power, no one in Iraq has critically addressed the
long-term environmental concerns in discussions
about new nuclear facilities. On the contrary, an Iraqi
scientific journal made the case that whatever the
negative aspects in terms of the environment, nuclear
power was still the best long-term option.94
An unnamed Iraqi government scientist, in fact,
assured the public that nuclear energy “cannot cause
pollution to the environment.”95 Other Iraqis, such as
nuclear scientist Asad Al-Khafaji, have minimized the
risks of radiation in general, with the latter declaring
his belief “that the risk of being struck by a speeding
car, or drowning at sea, or falling from the tenth story,
or having a cup full of sulfuric acid spilled on one’s
head is [no] less dangerous than being exposed to
radiation!”96 In fact, Al-Khafaji imputed such concerns
to a foreign campaign to turn Iraqis against nuclear
power contrary to the country’s national interest.97
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Joining the debate, an Iraqi cinematographer even
suggested that there was ample space in the deserts in
the Middle East to dispose of nuclear waste safely.98 As
in the case of civilian nuclear reactors, even for those
tied to weaponization, most Iraqis involved in discussions of nuclear power do not voice concern about
potential dangers. When one Iraqi did voice reservations about the environmental dangers of nuclear
power, it was confined to Iranian reactors, but that
may have been more politically motivated than based
on environmental criteria.99
To be sure, Iraqis have been sensitive to the presence, in Iraq, of any U.S. WMD. For example, Article
7 of the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement adopted
in December 2008, only allows the United States to
introduce military equipment into the country “on condition that it has no direct or indirect connection to
weapons of mass destruction (chemical weapons,
nuclear weapons, radiological weapons, biological
weapons, and the wastes related to such weapons).”100
However, in this case, sovereignty issues were probably
more important than environmental ones.
Again, the Kurds have had a different point of view
than other Iraqis, with one of their leaders, Masoud
Al-Barzani, reiterating his general opposition to any
nuclear activity whatsoever in Iraq: “Actually, I am
simply against nuclear weapons. I am even against
building a nuclear reactor for peaceful purposes,”
citing the risk of a catastrophic nuclear accident.101
PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS
Although the nuclear power situation in Iraq is still
evolving, with the opinions surveyed here indicating a
variety of views on some issues, the positions expressed
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by those Iraqis who are knowledgeable, involved, and
influential as to policy do help clarify some trends for
the future.
The Near-Term Trajectory.
In Iraq, one should expect the same movement
toward nuclear power as in the rest of the Middle
East. Iraq is an integral part of what has long been
recognized as a regional system in terms of security,
politics, and culture and cannot be insulated from
broader regional dynamics.102 As an Iraqi academic
argued at a conference, Iraq, because of its geographic
location, is part of the Arab world, and one cannot
simply separate or isolate it from its Arab neighbors.103
Moreover, as another academic emphasized, “Arab,
Islamic, and regional” forces cannot escape having an
impact on Iraq’s policies.104
Even with the still tenuous domestic situation,
most Iraqis feel that their country by right ought
to play a—or the—leading role in the Arab world.
Despite the domestic fragmentation in Iraq, there
seems to be an emerging academic consensus, at least
among those able to overcome confessional loyalties,
that Iraq should again play a major regional role, and
that what is holding Iraq back from “influencing the
regional system” is only “the lack of consensus among
the patriotic Iraqi forces.” Moving from analysis to
prescription, a conference participant concluded that
“Iraq must regain its place in the world and in the
Arab world in general, and vis-à-vis the neighboring
countries in particular.”105 As the Deputy Chair of
Iraq’s National Assembly reminded his colleagues at
the 15th Conference of Arab Parliaments held in Oman
in 2009, “Iraq is still an important factor in the Arab
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world [Umma],” and he assured them that Iraq would
be “returning to the Arab arena in full force.”106
As noted, Iraq is part of a regional geostrategic
and political system, and what its neighbors do with
respect to nuclear power is likely to have a significant
impact on Baghdad’s own decisionmaking process.
Even more than Iran’s actions with regard to nuclear
weapons, what Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Turkey do may
be even more salient for Iraq. Some Iraqi observers take
it for granted that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons
then the Arab states in the Gulf, for their part, will
be impelled to undertake “an arms race, including a
nuclear one,” adding an additional unsettling factor to
the Iraqi calculus.107
For many Iraqis, being a regional leader, as noted
above, also means being a leader in the field of nuclear
power. It should not be surprising that Iraqis would
want to participate in the same trends emerging
around them in the region. At the moment, and for the
foreseeable future, the tendency among virtually all of
Iraq’s neighbors is to consider or actually embark on
some type of nuclear power development, including
some oil-rich states such as the UAE and Kuwait. Any
Iraqi government will likely seek to avoid opening
itself to criticism for its lack of support of scientific
progress, whether in comparison to Iraq’s neighbors
or to the previous regime. Scientific achievements, and
especially in the glamorous and high-profile field of
atomic power, may well be the chosen vehicle to bolster
the new regime’s domestic and regional legitimacy.108
Rebuilding an Infrastructure.
There have been discreet initiatives by the Iraqi
government to help reestablish a nuclear program.
Of course, in the recent past, the development of
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civilian and military nuclear programs in Iraq were
intertwined, serving as a catalyst for conflict with the
West, particularly the United States, one could have
expected that after Saddam’s fall and the end of the
occupation, measures would be taken to reorganize
the country’s nuclear establishment.
In August 2003, the Provisional Government formed the Ministry of Science and Technology, absorbing
the formerly independent Atomic Energy Organization and the Military Industrialization Corporation.
Some Iraqis voiced this as an attempt to downgrade
the country’s nuclear potential, with an editorial in an
Iraqi scientific journal criticizing the move and calling
for “a review of the hasty decision.” The editorial
suggested that at least a separate nuclear directorate
be retained in the new ministry, arguing that all
“developed countries” have nuclear power agencies.109
A distinct National Nuclear Power Committee was
established within the new Ministry. In 2009, the
Baghdad government also announced its intention to
establish an official independent oversight body, the
National Committee for Atomic Energy, to not only
coordinate with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and other relevant foreign entities, but
also “to energize the Iraqi nuclear installations” and
“to prepare high-quality specialists [for overseeing]
the national program in order to prepare such cadres
of [the appropriate] quality and number.”110
Over time, Iraq has taken concrete steps to rebuild
at least some aspects of its nuclear capabilities. Iraq’s
Minister of Science and Technology, Ra’id Fahmi,
for example, requested formally that his country’s
outstanding “nuclear file” dating from the Saddam
regime be “closed . . . completely . . . officially, and for
good,” and cast his case against the lingering obstacles
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in terms of “the right of states” to use nuclear power
for peaceful purposes.111 One can sense an underlying
resentment, even within government circles, of what
is perceived as an unjustified suppression of Iraq’s
legitimate right to atomic power. For example, when
announcing that Iraq would adhere to the IAEA’s
additional protocols on nuclear assurances, the
government spokesman, Ali Al-Dabbagh, added that
this would help strengthen Iraq’s ongoing efforts to
end the oversight of the IAEA’s Iraqi task force by
eliminating the “excuses” (mubarrirat) on which some
Security Council countries rely to have that team
continue its oversight work.112
In practical terms, the Iraqi government has also
worked to reintegrate the country into the Arab world’s
official nuclear research mainstream and to highlight
the country’s expertise after years of isolation. The Arab
world, for its part—perhaps anxious for additional
balance between Iran and Israel—has indicated that
it would welcome Iraq back in the nuclear fold. For
example, Iraq has been able to resume cooperation
with the Arab League’s Atomic Energy Agency. The
Secretary General of the Arab League, Egypt’s Amr
Moussa, reiterated in August 2008 to a visiting Iraqi
delegation dealing with nuclear power that “the Arab
countries must absolutely enter the field of the peaceful
uses of atomic energy.”113 Iraq also served as the Chair
for the Arab League’s 3-day conference monitoring
Israeli nuclear activity “in violation of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” held in Cairo
in 2008, and helped work on the joint Arab position in
response to “the threat of Israel’s nuclear weapons.”114
Later that same year, the Director General of the
Arab Atomic Energy Organization invited a highlevel Iraqi delegation to participate in the agency’s
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21st conference in Beirut, Lebanon, where plans were
discussed for Arab cooperation on the peaceful uses of
nuclear power to 2020. Iraq’s Minister of Science and
Technology stressed at the conference his country’s
eagerness to become involved again, stating that
Iraq was “fully prepared to offer the experience of its
scientists and specialists” to develop a joint strategy.
Moreover, he was gratified that a recommendation
was to be made to the Arab League to support the lifting of United Nations (UN) Resolution 707, passed in
1991, which had mandated intrusive inspections in
Iraq and prohibited activity in the nuclear field.115
Iraq has also been showing greater assertiveness
on other aspects of this issue, with its National
Assembly, for example, in 2009, resurfacing an earlier
claim against Israel for compensation for the damage
the latter caused by its 1981 air strike against Iraq’s
Osirak/Tammuz reactor.116 This issue has continued
to remain active, with complaints that since Iraq was
obliged to continue paying reparations for the 1990
invasion of Kuwait and since it still owed money to
France for the reactor, a 1981 UN Resolution calling for
reparations for the reactor should be enforced.117
During his visit to France in February 2009, Iraq’s
Minister for Electricity, Karim Wahid, requested that
France help build a nuclear reactor in Iraq “because . . .
the future is in nuclear power.”118 Also indicative of
Iraq’s interest in foreign assistance in the nuclear area
was the apparent gaffe by an Iraqi government official
in announcing that Italy’s partially state-owned Eni
energy conglomerate would invest in nuclear power in
Iraq. Eni, perhaps embarrassed by the public disclosure,
was quick to stress that its investment would be only in
the oil sector.119 By late 2009, an Iraqi diplomat, Ali AlBayati, Counselor at the Embassy in London, told Abu
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Dhabi’s Al-Arabiyya TV that his country had “begun to
study a plan to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes,” which he declared was “Iraq’s right.”120
Objective Obstacles. There are, to be sure,
significant practical obstacles that militate against a
rapid resumption of nuclear-related activity—civilian
and, even more so, military—to include the country’s physical infrastructure (still incompletely reconstituted), marginal fuel resources, and depleted human
capital.
Nuclear Materials and Facilities. Iraq’s nuclear
facilities were damaged by U.S. air strikes in 1991
and again in 2003, with decontamination and
decommissioning beginning with international help
after Saddam’s fall.121 Iraq’s recent disposal of its
nuclear fuel material also presents a serious obstacle
to a rapid reestablishment of its nuclear program. In
an operation shrouded in secrecy in 2008, Iraq sold its
stock of 550 metric tons (in 3,500 barrels) of apparently
commercial-grade yellow cake (milled uranium oxide),
to the Canadian company Cameco.122
The Iraqi government appeared to be sensitive to
domestic criticism, insisting that the entire operation
had been Iraq’s alone and that the United States had
only provided technical advice (although the U.S.
military had transported the materials, reportedly at
only 10 percent of the actual shipping cost).123 An Iraqi
government spokesman cited the reasons why Iraq had
divested itself of the material as being environmental
concerns and the expense of providing security, as well
as “the impossibility of using it locally anyhow.”124
As Iraq’s Minister for Science and Technology, Ra’id
Fahmi, later clarified, however, there were also
political motives, namely, a desire to meet the terms of
UNSC 1991 Resolution 687, so as to bring Iraq into full
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compliance with the provisions of the cease-fire of that
year.125 At the same time, the Minister saw this as an
important step toward acquiring assistance “for Iraq to
reestablish its right to engage in nuclear activities for
peaceful purposes.”126
Some in Iraq were incensed by the transfer of
the nuclear materials. Iraq’s Association of Muslim
Scholars, for example, fulminated against what it
called “the theft, . . . of a great national treasure” in
its Communique 568 of July 8, 2008. Calling for a
condemnation of the action, the communique reiterated
that the uranium oxide remained Iraqi property and
that “soon Iraq’s rights would return to the people.”127
Another Iraqi observer living in Sweden cast doubt on
the Iraqi government’s assertion that it had agreed to
the initiative, dismissing the rationale that it had been
done for the safety of the Iraqi population and labeling
the U. S. operation “banditry . . . more like the action
of a cowboy.”128 A former senior Iraqi military officer
likewise called those who claimed that the uranium
was sold out of fear that terrorists would gain access
“ignorant, gullible, and lacking a conscience.”129 He
insisted that the uranium had been locally mined and
should have been used locally rather than sold for “a
trifling price.”130
Iraq’s Scientific Community. Iraq’s scientific human
capital is also far from being reconstituted. To be sure,
the knowledge base gained with the breakthroughs
achieved in the last phases of Iraq’s program before
its sudden termination during the Gulf War is still
extant in the minds of the country’s former scientists.
However, they are now scattered and far removed.
With most now approaching retirement age and with
no sustained program in place to train and organize
their successors, reconstituting the old programs
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will become difficult and complicated unless present
personnel trends are reversed.
Nuclear scientists—as well as other Iraqi academics—have often felt threatened in the aftermath
of Saddam‘s fall. Many were pursued by the U.S.
occupation force for arrest in connection with their
previous activity. Moreover, it appears that many
intellectuals have also been targeted for assassination
or kidnapping, and many have fled abroad—including
to other Arab countries and Iran—because they felt
vulnerable.131 Reports of murdered Iraqi scientists
have been frequent in the Iraqi media and on the
Web, with one journalist claiming that “if one wants
to destroy this country, it can be accomplished by
killing its scientists,” since that would scuttle Iraq’s
“development, progress, and rebirth.”132 A leading
Iraqi nuclear scientist, Nur Al-Din Al-Rabi, estimated
that Iraq lost some 5,500 scientists through emigration
or assassination.133 Another source estimated that
of those killed, 350 were nuclear scientists.134 As a
baseline, an Iraqi nuclear scientist estimated that at
one time some 2,000 scientists and researchers, and
10,000 engineers and technicians, had worked on
Iraq’s nuclear program.135
While those responsible have seldom been identified and may include financially-motivated criminals,
Iranian intelligence, and sectarian killers, Iraqi
sources frequently have blamed unnamed “foreign
intelligence” or have alleged the Mossad, Israel’s
secret service, implicating at times U.S. acquiescence.136
The attribution to Mossad may be plausible, given
the latter’s track record of reported assassinations in
earlier years of individuals connected with Iraq’s arms
programs, allegedly including the developer of Iraq’s
“super gun,” Gerald Bull, and the then-director of its
nuclear program, Yahya Al-Mashadd.137
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The Iraqi government has more recently begun
to make efforts to reconstitute the country’s scientific
community by significantly raising salaries for
professors and announcing plans to send 10,000
graduate students and faculty in the sciences abroad
over the next 4 years for study and research.138 The
Iraqi government is also seeking to repatriate scientists in the diaspora.139 In 2009, Iraq’s Prime Minister,
Nuri Al-Maliki, specifically stressed the need to
invite nuclear scientists to return home.140 However,
due to continuing security concerns, this process of
reintegrating academics may be slow. As of October
2008, for example, of 6,700 professors who had left
after 2003, only 150 had returned.141 The United States,
for its part, developed a pilot program to recruit Iraqi
scientists formerly involved in the country’s military
research programs for new civilian jobs.142 Despite such
efforts, it is unlikely that the damage suffered by Iraq’s
scientific establishment can be undone quickly, and
there are indications that returning academics are often
disappointed by the lack of immediate employment
opportunities.143
Nuclear Security Concerns. Security related to a
nuclear program, both from accidents and the diversion
of nuclear materials, will remain a valid concern.
First, as with any nuclear program, and especially a
fledgling one, there is the possibility of mechanical or
human error, leading to an accident which could have
disastrous implications for the entire region.144 The
current reduced complement of experts in the field
available in Iraq and the still rebuilding government
structures may heighten the risk and complicate a
rapid and effective disaster response and damage
control capability.
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Moreover, radioactive materials inherent in even a
peaceful nuclear program could be misappropriated
by terrorists for use in a radiological dispersal device
(the so-called “dirty bomb”). The still unstable security
situation in Iraq and the continuing disruptive activity
by al-Qaeda, even if at a substantially reduced level,
are legitimate reasons for concern in this area. The
fact that three employees of the Ministry of Science
and Technology were arrested in 2008 on charges
of al-Qaeda membership highlights the continuing
potential risks of compromise by terrorists of sensitive
technology, information, or materials.145 The high
degree of corruption at all levels of Iraq’s political
system and society poses a real security vulnerability
in this respect.146 The dire economic straits under which
so many Iraqis live only magnify the risk for corruption
potentially leading to such a diversion.147
Although unlikely, the possibility of reestablishing
a covert Iraqi nuclear weapons program in the future
cannot be dismissed categorically. Despite the progress
made over time, there are still questions today about
the effectiveness of international monitoring of
civilian nuclear programs to ensure against diversion
of resources to a military program. A report of the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, which
evaluated the efficacy of the IAEA in detecting and
ensuring against such an eventuality, stated that the
inspection agency continues to have serious deficiencies in this regard.148 The willingness of other
governments to transfer nuclear technology in
return for money adds to the peril of covert nuclear
proliferation.149 Iraqis, however, seldom voice such
concerns. A rare exception was a leftist writer in Iraq
who did worry about the widespread trend in the
Middle East to seek nuclear reactors for allegedly
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peaceful purposes, noting that such technologies
could be diverted for military purposes.150
Iraq’s Decisionmaking Parameters on Nuclear Weapons.
Whether Iraq ever decides to seek to reestablish a
military nuclear program will depend on complex
domestic and regional dynamics.
The Factors in Decisionmaking. The preceding
analysis suggests that, despite the upheaval accompanying the U. S. invasion and the elimination of the
Saddam regime, the idea of the utility of nuclear
weapons may still be present in certain circles, and
may one day be revived in Iraq. Andrew Flibbert,
in particular, has made a cogent inferential case that
Iraq’s historical experience, geography, and regional
security situation will predispose it to renew its quest
for nuclear and other WMD even in the absence of
Saddam. He stresses enduring conditions as driving a
future return to proliferation in Iraq, while criticizing
what he terms the overemphasis on personality in our
analytical perspective, that is, a focus on the role an
individual such as Saddam played in such a process.151
As Flibbert puts it:
Without a fundamental transformation of the regional security environment, too many incentives will
drive any future sovereign Iraqi state to seek nuclear
and other WMD. Most of the underlying causes of
Iraq’s pursuit of WMD remain in place today, and
nothing is likely to change the continuing reality. The
war launched by the United States could generate the
greatest proliferation pressure of all.152

Some, on the other hand, have made convincing
arguments for the continuing importance and impact
of leaders and personalities in making key decisions
in world affairs, all the more so for the individualoriented regimes common in the Middle East.153
40

Perhaps the most fruitful framework for understanding the developing decisionmaking situation on
nuclear power in Iraq is a combination of both approaches. However important they may be, even
enduring historical or geographic factors do not
foreordain a country’s policies or security choices. As
an analogy, although naval theorist Alfred Thayer
Mahan isolated various long-term geographic, historical, economic, and social factors as predisposing a
nation to become a sea power, he nevertheless capped
his taxonomy with a final factor: “The Character
of the Government, including therein the national
institutions.” This human factor in Mahan’s judgment,
could balance the preceding natural conditions:
“Nevertheless, it must be noted that particular forms
of government with their accompanying institutions,
and the character of rulers at one time or another,
have exercised a very marked influence upon the
development of sea power.” He thus recognized that
governments have a free will, exercising what he calls
“intelligent will-power.”154 For example, countries
with a geographic configuration such as a long coastline or location near key waterways could still be
oriented on being continental powers rather than sea
powers—such as the United States until at least 1898,
or Japan until World War II—because of conscious
policy choices.
In that vein, what this survey of Iraqi opinion
within the informed public does indicate is the
existence of a domestic intellectual and political
environment that is receptive to the notion of nuclear
weapons as a useful and legitimate instrument of
national power. However, there is no direct linear
correlation between such opinions and the eventual
acquisition of nuclear weapons. In particular, there
would still be a requirement for a viable leadership to
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mobilize domestic opinion and resources, deal with
the international consequences, and then formulate
and implement concrete policies. As an Iraqi academic
argued, the geographic factor in and of itself is not the
sole determinant of Iraqi policy. As or more important
will be how decisionmakers utilize and maximize the
potential of geography to promote specific policies.155
The Domestic Political Dynamic. Iraq’s political
establishment at present is visibly fragmented, and
the political situation is likely to remain unstable for
some time to come, with Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurdish
blocs assessing threats and remedies from markedly
different perspectives, not to speak of the splintering
and shifting alliances within the confessional/ethnic
communities and political blocs themselves.156 Iraqi
intellectuals recognize that the role of their country in
regional and international affairs is still evolving and
anything but clear, a consensus conclusion reached at
a roundtable of academics in Baghdad recently.157 The
country’s political leaders will likely be distracted for
the foreseeable future by far more pressing domestic
challenges, and Iraq may be entering a long bout of
instability not unlike that of the 1950s-60s.
Whether certain attitudes are translated into
concrete policies in the near future or ever—especially
insofar as a renewed attempt to acquire nuclear
weapons is concerned—depends on numerous
unpredictable events. No one can forecast what the
final constellation of forces within Iraq will look like,
and internal dynamics will play a pivotal role in
determining Iraq’s security orientation and priorities
and its practical approach to WMD. Paradoxically,
if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, a Shi’a-dominated
government in Baghdad might welcome from Iran
a nuclear umbrella against Israel or hostile Sunni
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neighbors and perhaps forgo developing its own
nuclear arsenal. Such an eventuality would obviously
provide Tehran with continuing leverage over Iraq.
Or a nuclear Iran might help a Shi’a-controlled Iraq
by selling to it or otherwise providing nuclear knowhow and materials, perhaps as a way to help finance
Iran’s own nuclear program. Conversely, a Sunnidominated or secular government in Baghdad might
be encouraged by other Sunni neighbors to develop
nuclear weapons as a counterbalance to Iran if the
latter becomes a nuclear power.
It is reassuring that a recent Iraqi Minister of
Science and Technology, Rashad Mandan Omar,
categorically affirmed that Iraq would never acquire
WMD in the future, describing the reason as follows:
“Our country and our people are tired of all those
stupid policies which the former regime adopted,
and which cost us in material and moral terms.”158
Indeed, the new Iraqi Constitution, adopted in 2005,
bars the acquisition of all WMD. Article 9 states that
“the Iraqi Government shall respect and implement
Iraq’s international obligations regarding the nonproliferation, non-development, non-production, and
non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,
and shall prohibit associated equipment, materiel,
technologies, and delivery systems for use in the
development, manufacture, production, and use of
such weapons.”159 On August 19, 2008, Iraq signed the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. In addition,
in September 2009, the Iraqi Council of Ministers
approved a bill to establish a government agency to
monitor a ban on all WMD in Iraq, and forwarded the
legislation to the Parliament for discussion.160 Such
initiatives, however, may be insufficient in the long
term unless the present perceived threat environment
and domestic intellectual attitudes in Iraq change.
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The Limits of U.S. Guidance. U. S. moral suasion on
the nuclear issue may be undercut by what some Iraqis
perceive as an American double standard, in regard
to both its acceptance of Israel’s continuing nuclear
monopoly and its divergent approach to its own nuclear capabilities vis-à-vis those of Iraq and other
countries. For example, the late Isam Al-Baghdadi, then
editor of The Iraqi Scientific Review, surfaced the issue
in 2003, albeit somewhat elliptically. Having echoed
former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s questions
about the U.S. failure to ratify the Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty and its development of a new generation of
nuclear weapons, Al-Baghdadi wondered whether
the United States considered only its own interests in
dealing with the proliferation issue: “Why does the
[U.S.] prohibit other countries from looking after their
own security priorities?”161
Another observer likewise noted a double standard, taxing the IAEA for having been harsh with
Iraq’s nuclear program while being soft on Iran’s.162
Still another frustrated Iraqi commentator charged
that “America was silent and is still silent, along with
the other countries which have nuclear weapons,
about the Israeli nuclear program.”163 This perception
of a double standard by the United States with regard
to Israeli nuclear weapons has also led to Iraqi skepticism of U.S. proposals for a nuclear security umbrella in
the region, given Iraqi perceptions of Israel as a potential threat. One commentator pointedly inquired: “If
the United States defends Israel from Iran, who will
defend the Arabs from Israel?” He then recommended
that the Arabs create their own strategic counter,
balance to Israel.164
Ba’athi sources have been predictably vocal to the
effect that the United States was not preventing Iran’s
march toward nuclear weapons, with one commen44

tator even arguing that the United States was secretly
favoring “its old Iranian ally,” and that the United
States did not mind the latter’s acquiring nuclear
weapons with which it could threaten the Arabs.165
An Iraqi Shi’a writer, on the other hand, also criticized
what he saw as the U.S. double standard, but focused
on the fact that Washington was “pursuing Iran day
and night” while exempting India from controls over
its nuclear activity.166
CONCLUSIONS
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this
analysis.
1. In the near term, one can expect increasing Iraqi
calls for a revival of the country’s nuclear capability,
at least in the civilian sector, which reflects a general
consensus within key sectors of Iraqi public opinion as
well as a growing regional trend.
2. The Iraqi government will continue to reestablish
its legitimacy by its support of a nuclear program.
3. Significant practical obstacles will hamper rapid
Iraqi development in the nuclear field without foreign
support.
4. Despite a continuing widespread perception of
the utility of nuclear weapons, at least within some
sectors of Iraqi opinion, a near-term resumption of
a military nuclear program is not likely, although
volatile conditions in the region and within Iraq itself
could change that likelihood at some time in the future.
The nature of the government in Baghdad will be key
to any such decision.

45

RECOMMENDATIONS
Several policy recommendations can be made based on the preceding study. While some ways to help
manage the future are applicable specifically to Iraq,
others may require a regional approach that subsumes
Iraq.
First, U. S. and international policymakers should
start thinking about helping to manage the process of
an orderly, safe, and peaceful reintegration of Iraq in
the civilian nuclear sector. It will be difficult for the
United States or the international community to ignore
or to outright reject Iraq’s expectations on the nuclear
issue. Given the deeply-felt entitlement throughout
Iraq’s informed public and in light of the almost
universal regional trends, to seek to hamper Baghdad’s
parallel efforts may well be counterproductive, causing
significant resentment without succeeding in any case.
Joint projects and technical cooperation with
the international community could encourage the
establishment and application of robust environmental
safeguards and facilitate an effective verification
regime and strict accountability for Iraqi civilian
programs and facilities, while helping Baghdad
achieve its stated objectives. An ancillary benefit of
encouraging and guiding an Iraqi nuclear program for
peaceful purposes is that it could employ many of the
country’s nuclear scientists, including many of those
now in the diaspora, thereby reducing the likelihood
that they might put their talents to work for other state
or nonstate entities for nonpeaceful purposes.
Second, policymakers in the United States and
the international community should ensure that any
return to a nuclear program be accompanied by Iraq’s
acceptance of strict international monitoring and
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controls to prevent any diversion to the military field
or terrorist use. It remains to be seen whether Iraqis
would be happy with tight controls, such as using
imported already-enriched fuel, and ensuring that any
bomb-potential by-products are exported. However,
we should insist on such precautions. While a regional
regime of guidelines would likely be more effective
and more palatable to Iraq and other countries, such
an option is likely to stumble on the issue of exceptions
made for Israel.
Third, U.S. policymakers and military leaders
should focus on ensuring that any peaceful nuclear
program in Iraq is as secure from accidents as possible
which, as noted, remain a continuing challenge even
in technologically advanced countries. The United
States can help in this area by providing sound technical advice, as well as training in operational safety
and disposal of nuclear waste, and assistance with
the development of emergency response capabilities
to deal with the aftermath of any accidents.
Fourth, once stability in Iraq increases, U.S.
military and civilian government agencies should
launch an effort to educate the Iraqi military,
government officials, and the general population on
nuclear power. The focus should be on the realistic
benefits and costs of nuclear power, and in particular,
on the risks and undesirability of nuclear weapons.
Traditionally, the Iraqi military has viewed the use
of nuclear weapons as a viable warfighting tool, and
greater familiarity with the dangers of such a capability
might help dampen future desires to proceed in that
direction.167 This education can be accomplished as
part of broader existing security courses or specialized
instruction in the United States for key Iraqi personnel,
as well as through public diplomacy directed toward a
more general public.
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Fifth, intelligence analysts should continue to
monitor public opinion in Iraq on the nuclear issue,
as well as any covert activities which could lead to
undesirable results, including support from other
countries. At least for now, opinions can be expressed
fairly openly in Iraq, reflecting attitudes both inside
and outside the government. Developments in Iraq
are dynamic so that changes need to be recognized,
understood, and addressed in a timely manner.
Sixth, U.S. and international leaders can work to
modify the Middle East regional threat environment
so as to alleviate the domestic pressures for nuclear
proliferation both in the civilian and in the military
sphere. Unlike the realist assumption that states act
as monolithic entities, the Iraqi case reminds us that
frequently there is an interplay of fractious domestic
forces and opinions, and that the international
community can have an influence on outcomes by its
advice and even more so by its actions.
Specifically, a reduction in regional tensions
by defusing perceived threats resulting from longstanding conflicts, in particular the Arab-Israeli
conflict, could have a positive effect. A continuing fear
of Israel’s nuclear intentions, as well as the embedded
perception of a double standard by the international
community when dealing with Israel’s nuclear
weapons as opposed to those of other regional states,
spurs and justifies calls for the proliferation of nuclear
weapons as a counterweight. At the very least, genuine
progress toward a resolution of the Arab-Israeli issue
would create an environment that is less conducive to
consensus for the need of nuclear weapons. A parallel
effort affecting the regional environment in this
respect should aim to avoid threatening regimes such
as Iran’s with forcible change. Such threats can be
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expected to make regional rulers defensive, putting a
premium on acquiring a nuclear deterrent as a buttress
to regime security, thus sparking a cascade effect.168
Seventh, U.S. policymakers can reassure governments and publics in Iraq and elsewhere in the region by providing a protective umbrella against the
incipient Iranian nuclear threat they fear. Such a
step has been already broached in principle by U.S.
officials.169 An umbrella arrangement could play a key
deterrent role against an Iranian threat and could also
have a constructive impact on Iraqi decisionmaking,
since Iraq might be less prone to look for the same
capability in order to keep up with the rest of the region
if its neighbors were also deflected from pursuing
the nuclear weapons path. However, the inclusion of
Israel in such a pact or requests for a permanent U.S.
military presence in the region would likely derail it,
as Egypt has already made clear.170 Moreover, there
may be substantial doubts among Iraqis that have to
be overcome. Lieutenant General Wafiq Al-Samarra’i
dismissed outright any reliance on U.S. protection
against regional nuclear threats, arguing that “talk of
a U.S. nuclear umbrella for the region is misplaced
[qasir] . . . since there is no guarantee that the present
international balances and interests will continue over
the long term as they are now. Who can guarantee that
American power will continue as it is now?”171
Despite the complex challenges involved, this
concept—if properly refined in concert with genuine
progress on the Arab-Israeli peace process—could
provide at least a measure of security that might
slow down a regional arms race. Of course, it must be
approached in a less formal and less public manner,
perhaps as a private understanding of which all players are aware. In any event, any such U.S. assurances
need to be crafted in a way that eschews publicly
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highlighting the inability of local regimes to provide
for their own self-defense. Such a muted approach
would preserve their domestic legitimacy while at the
same time holding to a minimum the risk of the U.S.
being dragged into a local conflict.
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